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I. INTRODUCTION
EVEN MILLION pounds of cargo and 125,000 passen-
gers on 1,800 flights pass through Los Angeles Interna-
* The author wishes to thank Professor Jeffrey M. Gaba of the Southern Method-
ist University School of Law for his continued assistance with this comment. In addi-
tion, the author is indebted to David P. Page, a partner at the law firm of Gardere &
Wynne, L.L.P., for the idea behind this comment.
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tional Airport (LAX) on an average day.' Those passengers
embarking at LAX spend $17.7 million each day in the re-
gion.2 In addition, LAX generates $3.3 billion in aviation
activity at or near the airport itself and an additional $9.7
billion regionally from aviation and visitor services.3 More-
over, LAX provides over 50,000 direct jobs and 355,000 re-
lated jobs.' And LAX ranks third in domestic annual air
traffic.5 In short, LAX is "one of the most important eco-
nomic engines in the Western United States."6
But, this economic engine and other airports like it pol-
lute our air and threaten our health. In the South Coast
region of California,7 which has the nation's dirtiest air,8
aircraft account for a significant amount of the air pollu-
tion.9 The five commercial airports in the South Coast Ba-
sin (Los Angeles, Ontario, Burbank, John Wayne, and Long
Beach) contributed 0.3% and 1.1% of the total 1990 base-
line emissions inventory for volatile organic compounds
(VOCs) and oxides of nitrogen (NOx) respectively.10 If left
uncontrolled, these five airports will consume nearly 3.9%
Mike Keeley & Ted Stein, Perspectives on LAX; The Airport is a Public Enterprise;
American's Irrational Reaction to the City's Review of Past Policy Sheds Light on the Airlines'






7 The South Coast Basin includes all of Orange County and the more populated
portions of Los Angeles, Riverside, and San Bernadino Counties. Ventura County
lies to the northwest, the Southeast Desert severe ozone nonattainment area lies to
the northeast, and the San Diego severe ozone nonattainment area lies to the south.
59 Fed. Reg. 23,279 (1994). The current population of 13 million is expected to
exceed 18 million by 2010. Id.
8 The South Coast Basin has by far the worst ozone levels in the nation and is the
only area classified as extreme for ozone nonattainment. 59 Fed. Reg. 23,279
(1994). For the period 1990-92, the average number of actual exceedance days was
134.3. Id. Moreover, the South Coast Basin is one of only three areas classified as
serious for carbon monoxide nonattainment. Id. For the period 1990-92, the aver-
age yearly exceedance was 38. Id. The South Coast Basin's uniquely high levels of
pollution result from massive emissions generated in the area combined with an
especially adverse meteorology and topography. Id.
9 55 Fed. Reg. 36,458, 36,528 (1990).
lo 59 Fed. Reg. 23,264, 23,355 (1994).
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and 4.4% of the basin's allowable inventory of VOCs and
NOx, respectively, for the year 2010.11
Due to their severe health effects, 12 both the precursors
to ozone (VOCs and NOx) and carbon monoxide were in-
cluded in the original "criteria pollutants" identified for
regulation under the Clean Air Act (CAA). As a primary
focus, the 1990 Amendments to the CAA contain new meas-
ures intended to make reasonable further progress toward
ozone and other criteria pollutant compliance.1 4  The
South Coast Basin's inability to comply with these require-
ments of the CAA furnishes the backdrop for this
comment.
In direct response to the South Coast Basin's historical
non-compliance, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), on May 5, 1994, proposed a federal implementation
plan (FIP) 1 to attain by the applicable statutory deadlines
the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for
I IId.
12 Volatile organic compounds form with NOx to produce the "secondary pollu-
tant" ozone. JOHN-MARK STENSVAAG & CRAIG N. OREN, CLEAN AIR ACT: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 5.2 (1991) (citing H.R. REp. No. 490, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 198-99, 202-
03 (1990)) [hereinafter LAw AND PRACTICE]. Smokestacks or tailpipes do not di-
rectly emit the pollutant ozone. Rather, the mixture of VOCs and NOx "cooks in
the sun, producing ozone through a complex chain of reactions. The hotter the
temperatures, the greater the formation of ozone." Id. Ozone severely irritates the
mucous membranes of the nose and throat, impairs normal lung function, and
causes pulmonary and nasal congestion. 55 Fed. Reg. 36,458, 36,460 (1990). New
scientific evidence demonstrates that ambient levels of ozone not only affect people
with impaired respiratory systems, such as asthmatics, but healthy adults and chil-
dren as well. 59 Fed. Reg. 23,264, 23,269 (1994). In fact, regular exposure to ozone
for only six to seven hours at concentrations below those in the South Coast Basin
have been found to significantly reduce lung function in healthy people during peri-
ods of moderate exercise. Id. Furthermore, ozone can cause significant crop losses,
extensive forest damage, and deterioration of buildings. Id.
Similarly, carbon monoxide exposure is associated with the impairment of visual
perception, work capacity, manual dexterity, and learning ability. Carbon monox-
ide can also cause illness and death for people who already suffer from cardiovascu-
lar disease. Id.
" See 40 C.F.R. § 50.9 (1990).
LAw AND PRACTICE, supra note 12, § 4.1.
A FIP is a plan promulgated by the EPA Administrator to supplement a state
implementation plan or to correct inadequacies in a state implementation plan. 42
U.S.C. § 7602(y) (Supp. 111990). The FIP includes enforceable emission limitations
or other control measures, means, or techniques to provide for attainment of the
relevant NAAQS. Id.
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ozone and carbon monoxide in the South Coast Basin
nonattainment area.16 According to the EPA, the proposed
FIP will directly affect more than fifteen million people -
almost half of California's population - and virtually all
businesses in the South Coast Basin, Sacramento, and Ven-
tura areas.1 7 In particular, the proposed FIP includes inno-
vative control measures to reduce emissions associated with
airports.' 8
This comment focuses on whether the EPA has the au-
thority to adopt the proposed FIP control measures. First,
does the EPA have the authority to adopt provisions that
the state itself might not have the authority to adopt?19 Sec-
ond, can one federal agency (the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA)) preempt another (the EPA) ?20 In other
words, can the EPA issue, via the proposed FIP, operational
aircraft standards that could potentially jeopardize aircraft
safety?2 1 Third, if we assume that the EPA, under court or-
der to implement a plan for the state of California, is stand-
ing in the shoes of California, is the EPA, operating as a state,
preempted by the FAA and federal law?22 Before further
examining these legal issues, an introductory analysis of the
CAA, its structure, and relevant provisions is necessary.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Though federal air pollution regulation began with the
Clean Air Act of 1963,25 the CAA Amendments of 1970 gave
the Act its basic structure, which is retained to this day.24
M 59 Fed. Reg. 23,264 (1994). The proposed FIP also provides for ozone attain-
ment in the Ventura and Sacramento nonattainment areas. Id.
17 Id. at 23,268. The EPA expects the costs associated with the proposed FIP to
range from four to six billion dollars per year over the next sixteen years. Id.
18 Id.
19 See infra notes 147-168 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 207-248 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 169-206 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 270-282 and accompanying text.
23 Pub. L. No. 88-706, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18 57-18 5 7 (g)
(1964)).
24 Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970). See generally Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S.
60, 63-64 (1975) (discussing pre-1970 statutes).
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The 1970 amendments created "a federal-state partnership
for the control of air pollution."25 Nevertheless, "air pollu-
tion prevention... and air pollution control at its source is
the primary responsibility of States and local
governments." 2
6
Under section 109 of the CAA, the EPA must establish
NAAQS for any pollutant that might endanger the public
health or welfare. 7 CAA section 109(a) directs the EPA to
set primary NAAQS intended to protect human health and
section 109(b) directs the EPA to set secondary NAAQS in-
tended to protect against other adverse effects.2 8 By 1970
the EPA had promulgated national air quality criteria for
five major pollutants: sulfur oxides, particulates, carbon
monoxide, hydrocarbons, and photochemical oxidants.2 9
The EPA added nitrogen dioxide in 1971.30 Then, as a re-
sult of a citizen suit in 1976, the EPA added lead to the list
of so-called criteria pollutants.31
The criteria pollutants take their name from the regula-
tory process itself. CAA section 108(a) (1) first requires the
Administrator to list widespread, harmful pollutants.32 CAA
section 108(a) (2) then requires the Administrator to issue
"air quality criteria" for each listed pollutant.3  Once the
Administrator lists a pollutant and establishes criteria for
that pollutant, CAA section 109 directs the Administrator to
promulgate a national goal for that pollutant, namely the
NAAQS. 3 4
2- Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir. 1987).
26 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). CAA section 116 reads:
"[N]othing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any State or political
subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting
emissions or air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or abatement
of air pollution . . . ." Id. § 7416.
27 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
28 Id. § 7409(a)-(b).
29 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 771 (1992).
30 Id.
31 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976).
32 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
2 Id. § 7408(a) (2).
34 Id. § 7409(a) (1)(A).
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Compliance with the NAAQS by the original deadlines
was so difficult that the 1977 Amendments conditionally ex-
tended the original deadlines.3 5 Continued widespread
noncompliance for ozone, carbon monoxide, and particu-
lates provided the impetus for the 1990 Amendments.3 6
Pursuant to the 1990 Amendments, the EPA must, on a pol-
lutant-by-pollutant basis, designate as nonattainment areas
those locations that cannot reach attainment. 37 Areas that
are nonattainment for ozone are then further subclassified
depending on the level of noncompliance. 38
Primary responsibility for meeting the NAAQS falls to the
states.39 Each state is thus required to develop a state imple-
mentation plan (SIP) that provides for the attainment and
maintenance of the NAAQS throughout the state.40 Each
SIP must contain "emission limitations, schedules, and
timetables for compliance with such limitations, and such
other measures as may be necessary to ensure attainment
and maintenance of such primary and secondary stan-
dard."41 For example, with respect to ozone and carbon
monoxide, the 1982 version of the CAA required each SIP
to "contain enforceable measures to assure attainment of
the applicable standard not later than December 31,
1987. 142 Once a SIP is approved by the EPA, the SIP has
the force of federal law.43 If the state either submits an in-
adequate plan or fails to meet the submission deadline, the
EPA is directed to draft a plan for the state.44 This federal
implementation plan (FIP) is defined as:
35 LAW AND PRAcrICE, supra note 12, § 2.4.
96 Id.
37 42 U.S.C. § 7407 (d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
Id. § 7511(a)(1).
&I Id. § 7410(a)(1).
4 Id.
41 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
42 Id. § 7502(c).
43 Id. § 7413(b)(1).
44 Id. § 7410(c)(1). The statute reads:
The administrator shall promulgate a Federal implementation plan at
any time within 2 years after the Administrator (A) finds that a State
has failed to make a required submission or finds that the plan or plan
revision submitted by the State does not satisfy the minimum criteria
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a plan (or portion thereof) promulgated by the Administra-
tor to fill all or a portion of a gap or otherwise correct all or
a portion of an inadequacy in a State implementation plan,
and which includes enforceable emission limitations or
other control measures, means, or techniques (including
economic incentives, such as marketable permits or auc-
tions of emissions allowances), and provides for attainment
of the relevant national ambient air quality standard.45
III. HISTORY OF THE SOUTH COAST
BASIN LITIGATION
California first submitted a SIP for the South Coast Basin
to the EPA in February 1972.46 The EPA announced its dis-
approval of major portions of this SIP on May 31, 1972.47
Although CAA section 110 (c) (1) consequently required the
EPA to issue a FIP for the South Coast Basin, the EPA failed
to act.48 The inaction prompted a citizen's suit,49 and the
EPA was subsequently placed under a court order to pre-
pare a FIP by January 1973 that would provide for attain-
ment of NAAQS.5 0 The EPA then issued several proposed
FIPs containing extreme provisions such as gas rationing. 51
The EPA later revoked the proposed gas rationing provi-
sions that were due to take effect in 1977.52
established under section 7410(k) (1) (A) of this section, or (B) disap-
proves a State implementation plan submission in whole or in part,
unless the State corrects the deficiency, and the Administrator ap-
proves the plan or plan revision, before the Administrator promul-
gates such Federal implementation plan.
Id.
45 42 U.S.C. § 76 02(y) (Supp. II 1990).
- Coalition for Clean Air v. EPA, 971 F.2d 219, 222 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S, Ct. 1361 (1993) [hereinafter Coalition].
47 37 Fed. Reg. 10,842, 10,851-55 (1972).
48 Coalition, 971 F.2d at 222.
4- 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. 11 1990). CAA § 304 provides that "any person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf - (2) against the Administrator where
there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this
chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator." Id.
- Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, 4 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1728, 1731 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
51 See, e.g., 38 Fed. Reg. 2194, 2194-2200 (1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 31,232, 31,232-55
(1973).
52 41 Fed. Reg. 45,565 (1976). The EPA revoked the gas rationing regulations
due to "the seriously disruptive social and economic consequences of such regula-
1995] 923
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In 1977, Congress amended the CAA to give nonattain-
ment areas more time to comply with primary NAAQS. 53
The 1977 Amendments extended the deadline to 1982 and
authorized certain extensions to 1987. 54 California then
submitted another SIP for the South Coast Basin, request-
ing an extension of the ozone and carbon monoxide attain-
ment dates to 1987. 55 The EPA disapproved the SIPs for
ozone and carbon monoxide on January 21, 1981, because
California had failed to adopt a motor vehicle inspection
and maintenance program. 6 But on July 30, 1983, the EPA
approved the carbon monoxide and ozone control meas-
ures without requiring any demonstration that the SIP
measures would achieve attainment by the statutory
deadline.57
Subsequently, Mark Abramowitz, supported by several en-
vironmental groups, filed a citizen's suit58 challenging the
EPA's 1983 decision to approve the SIP.59 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the "EPA exceeded its authority under the
Clean Air Act by approving the control measures without
determining whether those measures would demonstrate
attainment by the December 31, 1987 statutory deadline."60
In order to comply with the Ninth Circuit's order, the EPA
disapproved California's SIP for the South Coast Basin on
tions" although the revocation would "render the affected [implementation plans]
defective as a legal matter, since such [plans] will no longer contain regulations
which provide for NAAQS attainment." Id.
5s Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977). Across the board, states had failed to
attain NAAQS. Id.
Id. at 746-48.
5s Coalition, 971 F.2d at 222.
56 46 Fed. Reg. 5965, 5975 (1981).
57 49 Fed. Reg. 30,300, 30,305 (1984). The EPA's reasoning was not clear; the
agency simply noted that it was deferring any final approval or disapproval of the
attainment provisions in the SIP. Id.
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). This section provides that any
person may file a petition for review of (1) the Administrator's action in promulgat-
ing an implementation plan or (2) any other final action of the Administrator. Id.
N Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1987). The environmental groups
included: the Sierra Club, the Citizens for a Better Environment, the Coalition for
Clean Air, the Group Against Smog Pollution, and Clean Air Now.
Id. at 1072-73.
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January 22, 1988.61 As such, the CAA once again required
the EPA to adopt a FIP for both ozone and carbon monox-
ide for the South Coast Basin.62
In response to the EPA's recurring inaction, the Coali-
tion for Clean Air and the Sierra Club filed another citi-
zen's suit to enforce the EPA's obligation to promulgate
FIPs for ozone and carbon monoxide for the South Coast
Basin.63 The parties subsequently entered into a settlement
agreement. Under the terms of the settlement agreement,
the EPA agreed to finalize the proposed FIP by February 28,
1991.64
On November 30, 1991, just two weeks after President
Bush signed the 1990 Amendments, the EPA asked the dis-
trict court to vacate the settlement agreement and to dis-
miss the case on the basis of the 1990 Amendments. 65 The
district court vacated the settlement, agreeing with the EPA
that the states must write plans according to the deadlines
and criteria in the new amendments.66
In Coalition for Clean Air v. EPA,67 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that
the 1990 Amendments to the CAA did not relieve the EPA
from its obligation to issue a FIP for the South Coast Ba-
sin. 8 The EPA argued that its mandatory obligation to is-
sue a FIP would arise only if California did not submit an
adequate SIP under the new deadlines set forth in the 1990
Amendments. 69 As the EPA read the Amendments, the ear-
liest date a FIP would be required for the South Coast Basin
is April 15, 1998.70
The Ninth Circuit, relying on the plain language of the
statute and the EPA's disapproval of California's 1988 SIP,
61 53 Fed. Reg. 1780, 1780 (1988).
6 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
- Coalition, 971 F.2d at 222.
- 55 Fed. Reg. 36,458-576 (1990).
6 Coalition, 971 F.2d at 223.
66 Id.
- 971 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1361 (1993).
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held that CAA section 110(c) (1) (B) 71 did in fact impose a
current obligation on the EPA to promulgate an ozone and
carbon monoxide FIP for the South Coast Basin.72 The
court stated that the EPA had a duty to prepare the FIP
under the 1990 Amendments for major areas in the state
that are not complying with air quality standards (nonat-
tainment areas) and that lack an EPA-approved SIP. 73 On
July 1, 1992, the Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to
reinstate the settlement and to establish an "expeditious
schedule for EPA to promulgate final implementation plans
for the South Coast." 74
As mentioned above, the EPA finally proposed a FIP on
May 5, 1994.75 Nonetheless, the EPA continues to empha-
size that "[i]t is most appropriate for state and local agen-
cies to play the lead roles in addressing their own air
pollution problems." 76  Consequently, the EPA will with-
draw or rescind any federal measure it either proposes or
promulgates once it approves acceptable SIP measures sub-
71 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) requires the Administrator to promulgate a Federal im-
plementation plan at any time within 2 years after the Administrator: "(B) disap-
proves a State implementation plan submission in whole or in part, unless the State
corrects the deficiency, and the Administrator approves the plan or plan revision,
before the Administrator promulgates such Federal implementation plan." Id.
§ 7410(c) (1) (B).
7a Coalition, 971 F.2d at 228; see also Wisconsin v. Thomas, 29 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1077 (E.D. Wisc. 1989). In Thomas the EPA had disapproved Illinois and
Indiana SIPs for ozone. The Thomas court, citing CAA section 110(c)(1)(B), stated
that once the EPA disapproves a state implementation plan, the Administrator as-
sumes a nondiscretionary duty to formulate a federal plan for pollution control. Id.
at 1078. The court therefore ordered the EPA to promulgate a FIP for ozone con-
trol within fourteen months, "the longest period allowable under any reading of the
statutes." Id. The court rendered this decision, however, prior to the 1990
Amendments.
7- Coalition, 971 F.2d at 228.
74 Id. On February 22, 1993, the Supreme Court chose not to review the Ninth
Circuit's decision requiring the EPA to promulgate a FIP for ozone and CO for the
South Coast Basin. EPA v. Coalition for Clean Air, 113 S. Ct. 1361 (1993).
75 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,279.
76 Id. at 23,269. The "EPA strongly supports State and local initiatives" and
"[w]herever legally permissible, EPA's own proposal relies on, builds upon, and re-
inforces these initiatives." 55 Fed. Reg. 36,460 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 51,52) (proposed Sept. 5, 1990). Such state and local initiatives in the South
Coast Basin are driven by the District. See infra note 78.
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mitted by the state." In other words, the "EPA hopes these
FIPs will become obsolete as a regulatory matter."78
The South Coast Air Quality Management District (Dis-
trict)79 submitted its most current draft clean air plan for
SIP approval on April 25, 1994, shortly before the EPA pro-
posed the FIP.8 ° That plan contains more than 100 new
and already adopted control strategies, expected to de-
crease emissions of VOCs by seventy-four percent and emis-
sions of NOx by seventy-nine percent by 2010.81 As
expected, the District's most recent plan relies on and ex-
pands its basin-wide facility emissions trading program, RE-
CLAIM.82 In addition, the plan employs a number of clean
air technologies and a variety of mobile source controls.83
Specifically, the plan would rely on several control meas-
ures included in the proposed FIP that are aimed at reduc-
ing emissions from previously unregulated mobile sources,
including aircraft.84
59 Fed. Reg. at 23,270.
78 Id.
The District, the "largest and best funded, and one of the most sophisticated
agencies of its kind," relies on a staff of 1000 and an annual budget of $100 million.
55 Fed. Reg. at 36,460. In California, local air pollution control districts and air
quality management districts have the primary responsibility for adopting rules and
regulations for all but vehicular sources. CAL. HEALTH & SArTY CODE §§ 39002,
40000 (West 1986). These state and local rules and regulations must first be ap-
proved by the state agency, the California Air Resources Board, and are then for-
warded to the EPA to be included in the California SIP. Id. §§ 40704, 39602 (West
1986).
8o California: South Coast Basin Draft Air Plan Includes Market Incentives, Technologies,
Controls, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 27 (May 6, 1994).
81 Id.
82 Id. Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) allows emission trading
between facilities. Id. If a particular source were able to reduce emissions below the
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IV. THE SOUTH COAST BASIN PROPOSED FIP
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
To comply with the ozone NAAQS, the South Coast Basin
must reach ozone attainment by 2010.85 As such, VOC
emissions must be reduced by ninety percent and NOx
emissions by seventy percent.8 6 To attain the carbon mon-
oxide standard by the target date of 2000, the South Coast
Basin must reduce carbon monoxide emissions by forty-five
percent.8 7 Consequently, the proposed FIP includes a vari-
ety of stringent control measures: controls for onroad and
nonroad mobile sources; a supplemental inspection and
maintenance program; regulations for stationary and area
sources (service stations, livestock waste, petroleum and
chemical facilities, waste burning); an emissions cap; new
technology commitments; and a control program designed
particularly for national transportation sources. 88
B. AVIATION SPECIFIC PROVISIONS
The litigation that resulted in the proposed FIP arose
partially because of the South Coast Basin's concern that
emissions regulation of sources associated with interstate
transportation or military bases was not keeping pace with
controls in other sectors. Consequently, the proposed FIP
includes new controls for locomotives, airports and aircraft,
large marine vessels, and military installations.8 9 Although
this comment focuses on the control measures applicable
to commercial aviation, the EPA also proposed regulations
59 Fed. Reg. at 23,272.
86 Id. at 23,271-72.
87 Id. at 23,272.
Id. at 23,300.
- Id. at 23,275. For the South Coast Basin aviation industry, the EPA proposed a
range of percentage reductions from the 1990 baseline emissions, summarized be-
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for military aircraft, general aviation aircraft, and public
aircraft.90
The EPA proposed that commercial aviation 9 operations
be subject to an environmental performance target, includ-
ing mobile emissions sources under the direct control of
the airlines (aircraft, aircraft auxiliary power units, ground
service equipment, captive vehicle fleets, and any other air-
line-operated mobile sources).92 Beginning in 2001, the
EPA will set declining emissions rate targets for these emis-
sions consistent with the caps proposed elsewhere in the
FIP for stationary sources.93 The allowable emissions level
would translate into an industry-wide environmental per-
formance target, expressed as an allowable pounds of pollu-
tant per passenger equivalent unit (PEU). 94 Airlines that
exceed their allowable performance factor would pay a fee
based on the exceedance amount.9 5 To provide the airlines
some flexibility in meeting the targets, the EPA also pro-
posed intra-airline averaging for airlines with operations at
multiple airports within the South Coast Basin.96 In addi-
tion, the EPA might consider an inter-airline credit and
trading program similar to the District's RECLAIM
program.97
90 Military aircraft are those aircraft operated by the Department of Defense. 59
Fed. Reg. at 23,355, 23,364. General Aviation aircraft are aircraft privately owned
and operated on a nonscheduled basis. Id. at 23,355, 23,369. Public aircraft are
aircraft operated by federal, state, or local government agencies other than the De-
partment of Defense. Id. at 23,355, 23,372.
91 Commercial aircraft are defined by the EPA as those aircraft operated on a
scheduled basis by international carriers, national carriers, regional carriers, com-
muter air carriers, and unscheduled charter operators. 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,355.
Commercial airlines include all air carriers operating aircraft with any of the follow-
ing FAA operational certificates: Parts 121, 125, 127, 129, and 135. Id. at 23,356.





'7 Id. The DOT commented that the EPA should undertake further study before
such a program is implemented. U.S. Department of Transportation, Comment to
the EPA Proposed Rulemaking for Federal Implementation Plans for the State of
California, 12 (Aug. 31, 1994) (on file with the EPA) [hereinafter DOT Comment];
see supra note 81.
1995] 929
930 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
The proposed FIP strategy for commercial aircraft opera-
tions focuses on reducing total emissions from all sources
under the direct control of commercial airlines operating
at all airports in the South Coast Basin.98 Each airline is to
be responsible for its own compliance. 99 The proposed FIP
for commercial airlines would operate as follows. First,
commercial airlines will report activity and emissions dur-
ing the ozone season 00 and on an annual basis, beginning
in 1999.101 An airline's compliance is evaluated by compar-
ing the PEU with the EPA's published PEU for that year's
ozone season. Those airlines that exceed the PEU target'0 2
must pay a fee proportionate to the excess emissions.1 0 3
Through an iterative process, the EPA will set the emissions
fee at a level designed to discourage noncompliance. 10 For
example, if the proposed base fee were $10,000/ton of pol-
lutant and the airline made no improvement in environ-
mental performance, the maximum fee for the year 2005
would be $0.69 per PEU, equivalent to $120 per landing,
plus takeoff, for an average plane. 105 The EPA, however,
believes that a substantially higher fee would be necessary
to ensure compliance with the season environmental per-
formance targets. 10 6
98 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,356.
9 Id.
-® Id. Ozone season in the South Coast runs from March through October. Id.
The EPA proposed a constant annual reduction between the years 2001 and 2005
because the same approach was proposed for the stationary source declining emis-
sions cap. Id.
101 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,357.
102 The performance target will be calculated for each ozone season from 2001
through 2005 using the following formula: Performance target (lbs/PEU) = seasonal
emission limit (lbs) / seasonal projected activity (PEUs) 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,358. The
airlines will determine their compliance with the basin-wide performance target us-
ing the following formula: Performance result (lbs/PEU) = actual seasonal emis-
sions (lbs) / actual seasonal activity (PEUs). Id. at 23,359.
103 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,359.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 23,359-60.
i, Id. at 23,360. The DOT argued that this fee system is "simply targeted at reduc-
ing operations." DOT Comment, supra note 96, at 3.
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Each airline must file a baseline report to provide emis-
sions data for the year 1990.1°7 The baseline report, must
contain the following information: aircraft types and
model; engine type and model; number of landing/take-off
operations; taxi/idle time by engine for each flight; auxil-
iary power unit operating time; ground support equipment
population by type; and ground support equipment activity
by fuel type, engine size, and annual use hours.1 08 As de-
scribed above, each airline must also file an annual compli-
ance report.10 9 Such reports must include the following
information for aircraft and aircraft-related operations dur-
ing the seasonal control period: flight number for each
flight; aircraft type and model for each flight; engine type
and model for each flight; auxiliary power unit operating
time; number of passengers carried for each flight; weight
of non-passengers carried for each flight; ground support
equipment population by type; and ground support equip-
ment activity by fuel type, engine size, emission control
level, and number of hours used. 1 °
The aviation industry has challenged these proposed con-
trols due to their potentially devastating economic im-
pact.1 ' The industry strongly protested at a recent public
hearing held to discuss the South Coast Basin FIP. 12 To
begin, the EPA itself had admitted that the "[m]obile
source emission reduction requirements for autos, trucks,
planes, trains, boats, ships, and off-road equipment may re-
sult in higher costs to some and significant changes in the
mode of transportation for others."'1 3 The Air Transport
Association estimated that in order to comply with the pro-
posed FIP, flights into the South Coast Basin's airports
would need to be cut by forty to sixty percent.114 Barry
107 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,360.
lo8 Id. at 23,361.
log Id. at 23,360-61.
no Id. at 23,261.
I California: State Witnesses Say Economic Burdens Would Arise Under U.S. Implementa-
tion Plans, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 600 (July 29, 1994) [hereinafter "25 Env't Rep."].
112 Id. The hearing was held on July 18, and 19, 1994. Id.
11 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,268.
14 25 Env't Rep. at 600.
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Brown, a corporate attorney for Southwest Airlines, said the
new controls would force his company to curtail flights into
the Los Angeles area." 5 Similarly, Kenneth Churchill, a
spokesman for United Parcel Service, said the trucking and
airline control measures would so threaten his company's
Ontario, California office that it would consider removing
the forty-one million dollar payroll from the area if the FIP
is implemented. 16 Thus, it is not surprising that Los An-
gles Deputy Mayor Michael F. Keeley voiced his fear that
the FIP control measures will put Los Angeles airports at a
severe competitive disadvantage. 117
In addition, the Department of Transportation (DOT)
expressed concern over the economic impact of the pro-




118 DOT Comment, supra note 96, at 1. With regard to the proposed require-
ments for commercial aviation, the DOT makes several recommendations:
[1.] DOT recommends that upon approval of the SIP, the EPA re-
scind the FIPs in their entirety;
[2.] DOT urges EPA to revise the aviation emission control measures
to avoid measures that require air carriers to restrict traffic and capac-
ity volumes;
[3.] DOT urges EPA to avoid imposing commercial aviation emis-
sion controls that necessarily regulate aircraft operations and airport
access and, therefore, conflict with the FAA's legal authority;
[4.] DOT recommends that EPA establish aviation emission goals
that are safe and cost effective;
[5.] DOT urges EPA to avoid adopting emission regulations, such as
those proposed, that are likely to be considered inconsistent with in-
ternational obligations under the Chicago Convention and bilateral
aviation agreements;
[6.] DOT strongly opposes the use of fees, separate from clear, rea-
sonably attainable emission targets as a means of forcing reductions in
air service;
[7.] DOT recommends that EPA set final emission reduction goals
for aviation that do not place an undue economic burden on the trav-
eling public, local economy, and aviation industry;
[8.] DOT believes that the cost of compliance with the proposed
NPRM is higher for the aviation industry than for other sources and
recommends that EPA establish measures that have more equitable
costs;
[9.] DOT urges EPA to carefully study any proposal to trade emis-
sion credits;
[10.] DOT objects to the Passenger Equivalent Unit (PEU) concept;
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that "the plans will have extreme and unacceptable levels of
impact on the economy, employment, and the free flow of
commerce in the South Coast area."119 Furthermore, the
DOT believes the proposed FIP will leave many would-be
airline passengers unaccommodated.' 2°  The DOT also
warned that the disproportionate burdens on all-cargo car-
riers and commuter carriers may force them to cease opera-
tions altogether. 12' The DOT also fears that the proposed
FIP could adversely affect transportation safety, exceed the
EPA's legal authority, intrude into the FAA's jurisdiction,
and violate international agreements.122
In addition to concerns regarding the potentially devas-
tating economic impact of the proposed FIP, the airline in-
dustry and the FAA also fear that the controls could
potentially compromise airline safety.'2 3  First, the FAA
warns that the proposed controls will force commercial air
carriers to change their operations. 24  Based on informa-
[11.] DOT strongly recommends that Ventura County and Sacra-
mento County be removed from the FIP commercial aircraft emisson
controls;
[12.] DOT favors cumulative emissions limits for the season/year;
[13.] DOT urges EPA to minimize the emissions accounting and re-
porting burdens on aviation;
[14.] DOT recommends that EPA clarify the definitions relating to
aircraft operational classes to specify what aircraft are covered by the
regulations.
Id. at 2-15.
119 DOT Comment, supra note 96, at 2.
- Id. at 5 and App. I. In particular, if airline traffic growth increases by an an-
nual average rate of only 1.36% from 1990 to 2005, the airlines could meet the
EPA's less stringent reduction targets only by increasing load factors to 90%, an
increase the DOT believes unrealistic. Id. at 5. And, if a more realistic long-term
growth rate of 3.0% and a more realistic load factor of 62.2% (latest national aver-
age) were used, then, even under the EPA's less stringent targets, 46.6% of the fore-
cast passenger traffic would be unaccommodated. Id. At the higher EPA targets
58.7% of the passengers would remain unaccommodated. Id.
12, DOT Comment, supra note 96, at App. I. According to the DOT, all-cargo
operators would be unable to escape the payment of fees. Their only recourse
would be to cease air service in the South Coast Basin. Id. Similarly, commuter
airlines typically have very short passenger trip-lengths and would thus face higher
emission fees as a share of passenger revenue. Id.
"2 DOT Comment, supra note 96, at 2.
123 Id. at 6.
124 Id.
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tion from the aviation industry - specifically air carriers,
airframe manufacturers, and engine manufacturers - the
FAA believes that commercial airlines cannot meet the pro-
posed NOx standards "by any means short of reducing
flight operations."125 Second, the FAA cautions that some
suggested operational measures in the proposed FIP have
the potential to jeopardize aircraft safety. 12 6
The EPA has suggested, for instance, at the low end of
the range of compliance, strategies such as: converting
ground service equipment to cleaner power sources; in-
creasing use of single/reduced engine taxiing; implement-
ing procedural improvements to reduce congestion and
taxi/idle times; purchasing cleaner aircraft; and possibly
purchasing emissions credits. 27 The high end of the range
of control measures includes: towing aircraft rather than
taxiing; substantially improving load factors; and develop-
ing additional clean engine technology. 21
To begin, the FAA noted that because single/reduced en-
gine taxiing is feasible for certain aircraft at most airports, it
is currently extensively employed for economic reasons. 129
But, factors such as weather, taxi surface, taxi slope, ramp
congestion, and other similar conditions require "on-the-
spot judgment" of the pilot in command.3 0 Thus, the FAA
would challenge any FIP emission reduction target based
on capturing further emissions reductions from single/re-
duced engine taxiing as encouraging unsafe operation of
aircraft.13 1 Moreover, the FAA considers the EPA proposal
for towing aircraft unacceptable from a safety perspec-
tive. 32 In particular, towing aircraft raises both communi-
cation and control problems. 3 3 For instance, the use of a
125 Id.
-28 DOT Comment, supra note 96, at 6, App. II.
127 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,262.
128 Id.




13 Id. at App. II, 2.
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towing vehicle introduces the tow operator, who has limited
visibility, into the communication link.'34 Additionally, air-
ports would have to construct special large aprons, special
roads, and maintenance areas to implement such a towing
program.1 3 5
With regard to derated takeoff, any FIP emission reduc-
tion goal aimed at capturing further emission reductions
from this measure would also be challenged by the FAA as
encouraging unsafe operation of aircraft.1 36 The FAA
noted that reduced power takeoffs are currently used by
most air carriers to enhance engine life and to increase fuel
conservation.1 17 The FAA, however, warned that any der-
ated takeoff must remain within the discretion of the pilot
in command, because site-specific factors such as weight,
wind, weather conditions, and aircraft equipment are all
critical to the pilot's decision regarding when derated take-
off is safe.'
Similarly, the FAA argued that the ultimate decision to
employ thrust reverse must rest with the pilot in com-
mand.1 3 9 Variables such as runway condition, length, and
width; runway surface condition; winds; aircraft type, width,
and speed; return taxiway condition and congestion; and
proximity of aircraft following on final approach should all
be considered by the pilot in deciding when use of reverse
thrust is safe.140 Thus, any FIP emission reduction goal
aimed at capturing further emission reductions from de-
creased use of thrust reverse would be challenged by the
FAA as encouraging unsafe operation of aircraft. 4'
According to the DOT, the EPA's statement that opera-
tional controls with safety implications are alternative, vol-
untary compliance mechanisms is rendered invalid as a
134 DOT Comment, supra note 96, App. II. at 2.
,3- Id. at App. II, 2-3.
- Id. at App. 1I, 4.
,37 Id. at App. II, 3.
138 Id.
139 Id.
40 DOT Comment, supra note 96, App. II.
141 Id.
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result of corrected industry growth forecasts.1 42 Based on
the data in the EPA's update to the Technical Support Doc-
ument for the proposed FIP, commercial aviation, at a
growth rate of 3.2% will not be able to achieve even the low
end emission reduction targets for NOx even if the industry
employs all available compliance strategies.1 43  Conse-
quently, the DOT argued, commercial aviation will have
"no other option than to reduce operations." 44
V. THE EPA'S AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE THE
PROPOSED FIP
Several important questions remain unanswered regard-
ing the EPA's authority to propose the South Coast Basin
FIP. To begin, does the EPA have the authority to adopt
provisions that the state itself might not have the authority
to adopt?1 45 Furthermore, because the FAA traditionally is-
sues aircraft operational controls, does the EPA have the
authority to propose such measures in the FIP?1 46 In other
words, is the EPA preempted by the FAA? Moreover, as-
suming the EPA were not preempted by the FAA with re-
gard to the issuance of operational standards, is the EPA,
standing in the shoes of the state via substitution of its im-
plementation plan for the inadequate California plan,
nonetheless preempted by federal law?1 47 Finally, should
the EPA have the authority to adopt measures that will
likely further cripple the South Coast Basin's already dam-
aged economy?
A. THE EPA's AUTHORITY V. THE STATE'S AUTHORITY
One important unanswered question is whether the EPA
can adopt draconian provisions to assure attainment that
the state itself could not adopt. States must, in their SIPs,
142 Id.
143 Id. 6-7; see 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,362 (Revised Figure 3-29, "South Coast Options
For Action Table," Technical Support Document, dated June 14, 1994).
144 DOT Comment, supra note 96, at 7.
145 See infra notes 147-68 and accompanying text.
'4 See infra notes 169-206 and accompanying text.
147 See infra notes 270-86 and accompanying text.
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adopt provisions to assure attainment of the NAAQS. 1 48 In
Union Electric Co. v. EPAt49 the Supreme Court held that the
state plan may contain requirements more stringent than
necessary to meet the minimum demands of the CAA.
In Union Electric, the dischargers argued that states cannot
submit plans stricter than required by federal law under
CAA section 110(a) (2).150 CAA section l10(a) requires that
a state plan contain such control devices "as may be neces-
sary" to achieve the primary and secondary NAAQS. 51 The
dischargers argued that an overly restrictive plan is not
"necessary" for attainment of the NAAQS and must there-
fore be rejected by the Administrator.1 52 The Court noted,
148 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
- 427 U.S. 246, 265 (1976).
15 Id. at 262.
15, Prior to the 1990 Amendments, C.AA section 110(a) (2) read in relevant part:
The Administrator shall, within four months after the date required
for submission of a plan under paragraph (1), approve or disapprove
such plan or any portion thereof. The Administrator shall approve
such plan, or any portion thereof, if he determines that it was adopted
after reasonable notice and hearing and that -
(B) it includes emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for
compliance with such limitations, and such other measures as may be
necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of such primary or
secondary standard ....
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (1987). Note the similarity of the language to the current
section 110(a):
(1) Each State shall, after reasonable notice and public hearings,
adopt and submit to the Administrator, within 3 years . . . after the
promulgation of a national primary ambient air quality standard (or
any revision thereof) under section 7409 of this title for any air pollu-
tant, a plan which provides for implementation, maintenance, and en-
forcement of such primary standard in each air quality control region
(or portion thereof) within such State. ...
(2) Each implementation plan ... shall -
(A) include enforceable emission limitation and other control
measures. .. as may be necessary or appropriate to meet the applica-
ble requirements of this chapter;
(B) provide for establishment and operations of appropriate devices
... necessary to -
(C) include a program to provide for the enforcement ... to assure
that national ambient air quality standards are achieved ....
42 U.S.C. 7410(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (emphasis added).
152 Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 262.
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however, that CAA section 116 provides that states may
adopt emission standards stricter than the national stan-
dards. 153  The Court also read CAA section 10(a) (2) (B)
"to demand only that the implementation plan submitted
by the State meet the 'minimum conditions' of the Amend-
ments. ' 154 Thus, the Court ultimately held that because a
state may submit more stringent implementation plans than
required by federal law, and because "the Administrator
must approve such plans if they meet the minimum re-
quirements of § 110(a) (2)," the statutory language of CAA
section 110(a) (2) (B) provided no grounds for the Adminis-
trator to reject a state plan due to its economic or technical
infeasibility.1 5 5 In other words, the state is not required to
consider costs when formulating a SIP.'56
The majority's decision, however, left open the question
whether the EPA itself could adopt provisions more strin-
gent than necessary to achieve the minimum requirements
of the CAA. Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall rec-
ognized that, while states may submit plans more stringent
that the CAA demands, "[a] different question would be
presented if the Administrator drafted the plan himself pur-
suant to § 110(c)." 157 Just such a situation arises where the
EPA promulgates a federal plan, as in the South Coast Ba-
153 Id. at 263-64. CAA section 116 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1857(c)-10(c), (e), and (f)
(as in effect before August 7, 1977), 7543, 7545(c) (4), and 7573 of this
title (preempting certain State regulation of moving sources) nothing
in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any State or political
subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation
respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respect-
ing control or abatement of air pollution; except that if an emission
standard or limitation is in effect under an applicable implementation
plan or under section 7411 or section 7412 of this title, such state or
political subdivision may not adopt or enforce any emission standard
or limitation which is less stringent than the standard or limitation
under such plan or section.
42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
I Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 264.
155 Id. at 265.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 262 & n.7.
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sin or in the events leading to litigation in Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Co. v. EPA.158
In the facts of Cleveland Electric the EPA used its own mod-
eling methodology to impose a federal plan for sulfur diox-
ide pollution control for industrial dischargers in Ohio.
Petitioners in that case claimed that the "Real-Time Air-
Quality-Simulator Model" (RAM), used by the EPA to estab-
lish specific emission limitations, was invalid. 159 The court
felt the choice of RAM modeling lay within EPA administra-
tive discretion 60 and frowned upon "petitioners' slightly
disguised economic and technological infeasibility
arguments."''
Like the Supreme Court, the Cleveland Electric court relied
on the "as necessary" language of CAA section
110(a) (2) (B):
If the RAM model did over predict emission rates, such a
conservative approach in protection of health and life was
apparently contemplated by Congress in requiring the EPA
plans contain "emission limitations ... necessary to insure
attainment and maintenance" of national ambient air
standards.' 62
And, like the Supreme Court, the Cleveland Electric court
tied the stringency issue to the possible consideration of
costs, noting that the stringency issue does not appear to be
definitely resolved as to a United States EPA-designated im-
plementation plan. 6 3 Thus, although it is clear that states
can adopt plans more strict than necessary to meet the min-
imum requirements of the CAA, it is not clear whether the
EPA may do so.' 64
1 572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
- Id. at 1152.
160 Id. at 1162.
161 Id. at 1164. The petitioners argued that the EPA's choice of RAM modeling
was arbitrary and capricious. The Court apparently felt the petitioners were most
concerned, however, with what the petitioners perceived as excessive cost. Id.
M 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (B) (1970); see also Cleveland Elec., 572 F.2d at 1165,
n.5. ("United States EPA's S02 control plan for Ohio has as its goal the attainment
of national air quality standards. It does not seek to exceed them.").
163 Cleveland Elec., 572 F.2d at 1164.
164 Id. at 1164-65.
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The EPA, however, does not see its proposed FIP as
stricter than necessary. First, the EPA sees the new control
measures applicable to the transportation industry as neces-
sary to achieve compliance with the NAAQS.165 Second, the
EPA views itself as standing in the shoes of the state with
respect to promulgation of the proposed FIP.1 66 The EPA
takes this position because the Ninth Circuit held that
"[a] cting in place of the State of Arizona pursuant to a FIP
under 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c), EPA 'stands in the shoes of the
defaulting State, and all of the rights and duties that would
otherwise fall to the State accrue instead to EPA.' "167 In
addition, CAA section 302(y) defines a FIP as a "plan
promulgated by the Administrator to fill all or a portion of
a gap or otherwise correct all or a portion of an inadequacy
in a State implementation plan ... and provides for attain-
ment of the relevant national ambient air quality stan-
dard."168 In other words, the FIP serves as a substitute for
the SIP, with the EPA serving as a substitute for the state.1 69
B. THE EPA's AUTHORITY V. THE FAA's AUTHORTy
Ignoring the EPA as a substitute for the state concept mo-
mentarily, the question arises whether one federal agency
(the FAA) can preempt another (the EPA)? Stated differ-
ently, does the EPA have the authority to issue operational
standards for aircraft, a power traditionally reserved for the
FAA? The following analysis of this "federal v. federal pre-
emption" issue in the South Coast Basin scenario will look
to similar cases in which two federal agencies seek to regu-
- 59 Fed. Reg. 23,268, 23,273. The EPA recognized that most of the emissions
reductions that were either easy or inexpensive have already been achieved. Id. at
23,268. "For practically every controllable source category, this ultimate degree of
control is beyond a level now foreseeable with existing technology and control tech-
niques." Id.
- 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,300.
167 Central Arizona Water Conservation Dist. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 1531, 1541 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 94 (1993).
M6 42 U.S.C. § 7602(y) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
169 Id.
1995] THE SOUTH COAST BASIN FIP
late the same activity.1 70 If, however, one accepts the "stand
in the shoes" concept, then a more traditional "state v. fed-
eral" preemption analysis is proper.171
1. Operational Standards
The EPA claims that its broad powers under section
110(c) provide the legal authority for its proposed control
strategy.' 72 Nonetheless, in the proposed FIP the EPA spe-
cifically requested comment on "the relationship between
EPA's legal authority under section 110(c) and section
231."173
According to the EPA, sections 231 and 232 of the CAA
"establish a cooperative scheme" between the EPA and the
FAA. 174 According to Congress, the FAA has the authority
to regulate air traffic, including the authority to regulate
ground operations at airports for the "protection of persons
and property on the ground."175  This authority includes
the power to establish minimum safety standards for the op-
eration of airports.1 7 6
170 See Pennsylvania Elec. Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
969 F.2d 1501 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that Mine Safety and Health Administration
regulations preempted the Occupational Safety and Health Act); Columbia Gas of
Penn., Inc. v. Marshall, 636 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that regulations of the
Department of Transportation, Office of Pipeline Safety preempted authority of the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration); California v. Kleppe, 604 F.2d
1187 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that Congress did not intend that the jurisdictional
grants of the Outer Continental Shelf Act and the CAA could stand together); Moni-
tor Business Machs., Inc. v. AT & T Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,030 (C.D.
Cal. 1978) (finding that "[t]he regulatory control of customer-provided intercon-
nection devices by the F.C.C. under the public interest is incompatible with concur-
rent regulation under the anti-trust laws").
17 See D.R. Evans v. Board of County Comm's of the County of Boulder, Colo.,
994 F.2d 755, 760 (10th Cir. 1993).
172 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,362.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 49 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (1989) see also United Air Lines, Inc. v. Occupational
Safety and Health Appeals Bd., 179 Cal. Rptr. at 180 (stating that the phrase " 'safety
in air commerce' in 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (a) (6) encompasses more than safety of flight,
and includes the ground safety of airline personnel who are an integral part of air
commerce") (citation omitted).
]6 49 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1989). The statute provides: "The Administrator is em-
powered to issue airport operating certificates to, and establish minimum safety stan-
dards for the operation of, airports. .. ." Id.
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With respect to aircraft emission standards, Congress de-
tailed the primary role of the FAA in CAA sections 231-234,
Subpart B.17  Under section 231, the FAA is required to
review aircraft emission standards proposed by the EPA.178
The FAA has exclusive enforcement power with regard to
these emission regulations through denial or certifica-
tion.179 The FAA can also veto proposed standards if an air-
craft emission regulation would create a safety hazard. 1 0
Finally, only the FAA can prescribe regulations that insure
compliance with emission standards.181 Section 231 also
specifies that the EPA is required to study emission of air
pollutants from aircraft and to issue "proposed emission
standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant
from any class or classes of aircraft engine. "182
The power to regulate the operation of aircraft has tradi-
tionally been exercised by the FAA through (1) its authority
to regulate ground operations at airports "for the protec-
'77 Note that the relevant sections of the CAA refer to the Secretary of Transporta-
tion, but this power was delegated to the FAA pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 106.
178 42 U.S.C. § 7572(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The statute provides:
The Secretary of Transportation ... shall prescribe regulations to in-
sure compliance with all standards... making such standards applica-
ble in the issuance, amendment, modification, suspension, or
revocation of any certificate ....
Id.
7 Id.
- Id. § 7571(c). The statute provides:
Any regulations ... with respect to aircraft shall not apply if disap-
proved by the President... on the basis of a finding by the Secretary
of Transportation that any such regulation would create a hazard to
aircraft safety.
Id.
181 42 U.S.C. § 7572(a).
In Id. § 7571(a). In relevant part, the statute provides:
The Administrator shall commence a study and investigation of emis-
sions of air pollutants from aircraft in order to determine -
(A) the extent to which such emissions affect air quality...
(B) the technological feasibility of controlling such emissions ...
(2) The Administrator shall, from time to time, issue proposed emis-
sion standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any
class or classes of aircraft engine which in his judgement causes, or
contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare.
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tion of persons and property on the ground," 8 ' (2) its au-
thority to regulate air traffic, 184 and (3) its authority to
establish minimum safety standards for the operation of air-
ports.1 85 Moreover, even if Congress had not delegated to
the FAA exclusive authority to regulate aircraft operations,
the CAA does not clearly give the EPA authority to regulate
aircraft operations via issuance of operational or work prac-
tice standards for aircraft.186
As discussed above, the Administrator is required to issue
"emission standards applicable to the emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of aircraft engine."187
Emission standards and limitations are defined in CAA sec-
tion 302 to include "any requirement relating to the opera-
tion or maintenance of a source to assure continuous
emission reduction, and any design, equipment, work prac-
tice or operation standard promulgated under this
chapter."' 88
But, the Supreme Court has rejected the EPA's argument
that a "work practice standard is just another type of emis-
sion standard." 8 9 In Adamo Wrecking the EPA unsuccess-
fully argued that the definition of emission standard, in the
context of CAA section 112, was broad enough to include
work practices. In 1977, Congress subsequently amended
section 112 to provide that, if "it is not feasible to prescribe
or enforce an emission standard," the Administrator "may
instead promulgate a design, equipment, work practice, or
operational standard."' 90  Congress has not similarly
amended CAA section 231.191 It would appear, then, that
183 49 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (1989); see supra note 174, and accompanying text.
-8 49 U.S.C. § 1348(c).
-8 Id. § 1432.
-- 42 U.S.C. §§ 7571, 7602 (1988 & Supp. I1 1990). Note, too, that the DOT
believes that Congress intended the EPA to have authority to regulate aircraft emis-
sions only through CAA § 231. DOT Comment, supra note 96 at 6.
187 42 U.S.C. § 7571.
18 Id. § 7602(k).
i9 Adamo Wrecking Co., 434 U.S. at 289.
90 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e) (1977).
-I Id. § 7571.
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the EPA does not have the legal authority to issue work
practice or operational standards.
Nonetheless, the EPA views the proposed FIP as "well
within [its] broad scope of powers under section 110(c)."1 9 2
Specifically, the EPA notes that the emissions fee system is
based on a declining performance target expressed in per
passenger emissions that can be achieved through either op-
erational or technological means.1 93 Thus, according to the
EPA, it is not exercising its authority under section 231 to
promulgate technology forcing emission standards. 94 As a
consequence, the EPA believes that the proposed FIP con-
trol strategies "maintain[ ] cooperative interaction between
EPA and FAA and recognize[ ] FAA's expertise in aircraft
safety and navigation." 95
In essence, the EPA bases its position on the fact that "the
approach leaves each operator with the discretion to choose
the best compliance strategy for achieving environmental
goals and satisfying market demands." 96 The low end of
the range of compliance strategies includes measures such
as: converting ground service equipment to cleaner power
sources; increasing use of single/reduced engine taxiing;
implementing procedural improvements to reduce conges-
tion and taxi\idle times; purchasing cleaner aircraft; and
possibly purchasing emissions credits.1 97 The high end of
the range of control measures include: towing aircraft
rather than taxiing; substantially improving load factors;
and developing additional clean engine technology.19
8
Ironically, the EPA admits on the very same page that its
proposed FIP strategy may require airlines to "choose oper-
ational measures that, for safety reasons, should be left to
192 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,262.
Id.
' Id. at 23,362.
19 Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
197 59 Fed. Reg. at 23,362.
198 Id.
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the discretion of the pilot in command." 9 9 Moreover, the
EPA requests further comment if
after ... further study the Agency determines that at the
upper end of the emissions reduction range under consid-
eration, the requirement may have the potential to induce
airlines to choose between such options as encouraging im-
plementation of aircraft operational measures that currently
are left to pilot discretion for safety reasons on the one
hand, and limiting the number of operations at the airport
on the other.2 0°
As discussed above,20 ' the FAA has supplied the requested
comment and expressed its concern via the DOT's com-
ment to the proposed FIP.2 °2 The DOT warned that the
proposed controls will force commercial air carriers to
change their operations.0 s The FAA would challenge any
FIP emission reduction target based on capturing further
emissions reductions from single/reduced engine taxiing as
encouraging unsafe operation of aircraft.0 4 Moreover, the
FAA considered the EPA proposal for towing aircraft unac-
ceptable from a safety perspective. 0 5 With regard to der-
ated takeoff, any FIP emission reduction goal aimed at
capturing further emission reductions from this measure
would also be challenged by the FAA as encouraging the
unsafe operation of aircraft 0 6 Similarly, the FAA argued
that the ultimate decision to employ thrust reverse must
rest with the pilot in command. 7
Thus, both the EPA and the FAA recognize that the
choice between operational and technological change may
be illusory. Airlines may have no choice but to change their
operations - by increasing single engine taxiing, for exam-
ple - in order to continue to operate in the South Coast
199 Id.
-0 Id.
20 See supra note 96.
- DOT Comment, supra note 96, at 6.
203 Id.
- Id.
-" Id. at 6, 8-9.
-,6 Id. at 8-9.
27 DOT Comment, supra note 96, at 8-9.
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Basin under the proposed FIP. An airline that refuses to
make such operational changes, for safety or other reasons,
may have no choice but to cease operations in the South
Coast Basin entirely.
The above authority conflicts between the EPA and the
FAA could be viewed as a "federal v. federal" preemption
problem. As such, an analysis of other instances where two
federal agencies claimed authority to regulate the same ac-
tivity is helpful in understanding the various approaches
the courts may apply in dealing with this issue.
2. "Federal v. Federal" Preemption Cases
In 1987, the District Court for the Western District of
Michigan addressed the "federal v. federal" preemption is-
sue.2"' In National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Com-
pany environmental organizations brought suit against a
power plant to preclude the discharge of dead fish and fish
remains into the plant's turbine generating water.y 9 In
1969, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) (now the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)) had issued
the plant an operating license pursuant to the Federal
Power Act (FPA).1 ° Portions of the plant's operations,
however, were also subject to the scrutiny of the Michigan
Water Control Board, and hence to the EPA, in accordance
with the Clean Water Act (CWA).211
The plant argued that provisions of the FPA preempted
the environmentalists' claims under the CWA. 2  Specifi-
cally, the plant urged that its construction and operation
were subject to the control of FERC under the FPA and that
FERC had both the statutory obligation and the authority to
resolve the environmentalists' concerns.1 The National
Wildlfe court agreed with both the Court of Appeals for the
-~ National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 657 F. Supp. 989 (W.D. Mich.
1987).
', Id. at 995.
210 Id. at 993.
211 Id. at 994.
212 National Wildlife, 657 F. Supp. at 999.
213 Id.
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District of Columbia and the Second Circuit by rejecting
the proposition that the FPA preempts water pollution con-
trol laws.214 The National Wildlife court observed that "the
FPA and the CWA address different aspects of the facility's
effect on Lake Michigan.... [The] FPA ... is concerned
with reducing the number of fish that are entrained into
the facility... [while the] CWA... focuses primarily on...
the facility's ... extrainment of dead fish and fish remains
into the Lake."215
Applying a National Wildlife analysis to the South Coast
Basin situation, the primary inquiry is whether the FAA and
the EPA "address different aspects" of the regulated activ-
ity.2 16 If so, no preemption problem exists. If not, the Na-
tional Wildlife analysis does not resolve the issue.
In the South Coast Basin scenario the initial, and biggest,
hurdle is determining just what activities the EPA and the
FAA each seek to regulate. As discussed above, traditionally
the EPA has regulated air emissions217 and the FAA has reg-
ulated operational aspects of airports.1 In the proposed
FIP, this distinction is no longer clear. Because under the
proposed FIP the EPA and the FAA do not clearly "address
different aspects" of the activity, a National Wildlife analysis
does not solve the "federal v. federal" preemption issue at
work in the South Coast Basin. 9
Fortunately, the Ninth Circuit addressed a similar situa-
tion in California v. Kleppe.220 Exxon Corporation, Shell Oil
Company, and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. appealed from the dis-
trict court's ruling that it was without jurisdiction to review
a determination by the EPA that portions of the CAA
21 Id. (citing Monongahela Power Co. v. Marsh, 809 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir.),
cert.denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987), and Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Cal-
laway, 370 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd per curiarn, 499 F.2d 127 (2d Cir.
1974)).
215 National Wildlife, 657 F. Supp. at 999-1000.
26Id. at 999.I1- 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. 111990).
218 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1358 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
219 National Wildlife, 657 F. Supp at 999.
604 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1979).
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should apply to certain activities on the Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS).2 21
In particular, the EPA argued that portions of Califor-
nia's SIP for the maintenance of certain air quality stan-
dards should apply to the offshore platform known as the
Santa Ynez Unit.22 2 The EPA also urged that if the SIP did
not contain EPA-approved new source review223 and pre-
vention of significant deterioration 224 provisions, new
source review and prevention of significant deterioration
standards promulgated by the EPA should apply.22 5 In ad-
dition, Congress had enacted extensive amendments to the
Outer Continental Shelf Law Act (OCSLA) in September
1978 that directed the Secretary of the Interior to prescribe
regulation "for compliance with the national ambient air
quality standards pursuant to the Clean Air Act."22 6
The EPA concluded that the jurisdictional grant of the
CAA superseded the OCSLAjurisdictional grant.2 27 On the
contrary, the oil companies argued that section 1349 of the
OCSLA was the controlling jurisdictional grant.2 28 The
Ninth Circuit felt that the answer depended
not so much on the precise language and legislative history
of the Uurisdictional] grants themselves, but on the broader
question of Congressional intent with respect to the control
of OCS air quality. If EPA administration of OCS air quality
control is inconsistent with that scheme, Congress could not
have intended concurrent grants ofjurisdiction with respect
to regulation of such air quality and section 1349 alone
applies.229
For the Kleppe court the key issue was determining what
respective authority Congress intended for the EPA and
-1 Id. at 1189.
222 Id.
22 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
-4 Id. §§ 7470-79.
225 Kleppe, 604 F.2d at 1190.
2 OCSLA § 5(a)(8), 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (8) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
-7 Keppe, 604 F.2d at 1192.
228 Id.
m Id.
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OCSLA consistent with the scheme of air quality regulation
on the OCS.2 0 First, the court looked to statutory language
to conclude that the EPA authority over OCS air quality
control would be inconsistent with that provided to the Sec-
retary of Interior.3 1 Second, the court looked to legislative
history and found nothing "which clearly shows either that
Congress intended to limit the Secretary's authority in any
way or contemplated dual jurisdiction."2 32  Ultimately,
based on a finding that the OCSLA grant controlled and
that therefore the CAA jurisdictional grant could not apply,
the appellate court returned the appealed cases to the dis-
trict court for resolution of the parties' claims. 33
This paper has already completed the first step of a Kleppe
analysis - examining the problematic statutory grants to
both the EPA and the FAA in the South Coast Basin situa-
tion. The second step of a Kieppe analysis involves turning
to legislative history to see where Congress intended to vest
the authority in question.
As discussed above, the CAA outlines each agency's re-
spective role. Clean Air Act section 231 expresses Congress'
intent to limit the EPA's power to promulgate aircraft emis-
sion standards to the issuance of aircraft engine emission
standards.23 4 Moreover, Congress limited the EPA to issu-
ing only those emission standards determined by the FAA
to meet aircraft safety considerations. 3 5
The legislative history of CAA section 231 (c) supports
Congress' intent to place the FAA in this review and veto
position. 3 6 Specifically, the House Committee expressed
concern that "the consultation procedure provided for in
[pre-1990] CAA section 231 (c) of the existing Clean Air Act
is not an adequate mechanism to assure that emission stan-
- Id.
231 Kleppe, 604 F.2d at 1194.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1199.
42 U.S.C. § 7571 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
- Id.
2- H.R. REP. No. 95-294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 277 (1977), repinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1079, 1356.
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dards under CAA section 231 will not impair aircraft
safety." 237 In response to that concern, Congress amended
231 (c), removing the consultation procedure and introduc-
ing the veto procedure.23 8
Furthermore, in the preamble to the final rule, the EPA
itself recognized that the FAA "has the responsibility for de-
fining the appropriate means of enforcement .... -23' The
recognition that the FAA, not the EPA, will enforce air
emissions has been codified as CAA section 232 (a).240
Finally, legislative history may support the argument that
the EPA's authority over aircraft is restricted to the issuance
of aircraft emission standards applicable to a class or classes
of aircraft and does not include work practice standards. In
1977 Congress amended CAA section 112,241 giving the Ad-
ministrator authority to promulgate a work practice stan-
dard if "it is not feasible to prescribe or enforce an emission
standard." 24 2 Congress has not, however, chosen to simi-
larly amend CAA section 231 to include within the EPA's
authority controls on aircraft use.
In short, the legislative history of the relevant statutory
provisions appears to provide that the FAA, not the EPA,
occupies the primary role in the scheme of air emission reg-
ulations. But, even accepting that the FAA occupies the pri-
mary role in the scheme of aircraft emission regulations, it
does not necessarily follow that the EPA's role is "inconsis-
tent with that scheme" because the EPA ultimately issues
the emission standard.243 Thus, with the second step of a
23- Id.
28 42 U.S.C. § 7571(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Note that in Kleppe the court
termed "facially neutral" language in the legislative history that "the conferees in-
tend that the Secretary of the Interior shall be guided by the Clean Air Act, in con-
sultation with the Environmental Protection Agency... ." K/eppe, 604 F.2d at 1197
n.16. That court's reading of the legislative history suggests that the consultation
procedure is neutral, while something more, like veto power, more clearly defines
an agency's authority.
:39 Preamble 47 Fed. Reg. 58,469 (1982).
- 42 U.S.C. § 7572(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
211 Section 112 of the CAA provides the standards and policies for regulation of
hazardous air pollutants. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
42 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
243 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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Kleppe analysis complete, the "federal v. federal" preemp-
tion issue still has not been resolved.
Fortunately, other "federal v. federal" preemption cases
provide further approaches to the dilemma presented
when multiple federal agencies seek to regulate the same
conduct.244 Two cases, Pennsylvania Electric Company v. Fed-
eral Mine Safety and Health Review Commission245 and Columbia
Gas of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Marshall,246 dealt with situations
where a set of regulations came into conflict with Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) regula-
tions. In these cases, however, the analysis was somewhat
more straightforward due to an explicit preemption provi-
sion in the Occupational Health and Safety Act.247 Accord-
ing to Penn Electric and Columbia Gas, once a court is
"satisfied that a regulation was promulgated that covers the
challenged working conditions, OSHA is preempted and
the inquiry ends." 248 Unfortunately, no such explicit pre-
emption provision appears in the CAA to resolve the "fed-
eral v. federal" preemption issue.2 49
3. Noise Pollution Cases and Preemption
Another approach to the "federal v. federal" preemption
problem can be provided by analogy to the line of noise
244 See generally cases cited supra note 169.
24 969 F.2d 1501 (3rd Cir. 1992). In Penn Electric the electric company petitioned
for review of an administrative decision upholding a citation for failure to place
adequate guards around the head drives on conveyor belts. The court held that the
Mine Safety and Health Act preempted the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Id.
at 1505.
246 636 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1980). In Columbia Gas an employer sought dismissal of
an Occupational Health & Safety Administration (OSHA) citation. The court held
that Department of Transportation, Office of Pipeline Safety regulations that re-
quire steps to minimize accidental gas ignition preempted OSHA regulations. Id. at
918.
247 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); OSHA § 4(b)(1) (1970). The
preemption provision reads: "Nothing in this chapter shall apply to working condi-
tions of employees with respect to which other Federal agencies ... exercise statu-
tory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting
occupational safety or health." Id.
248 Penn Elec., 676 F.2d at 1504.
249 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-76 71q (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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pollution cases. 250 The seminal noise pollution case is City
of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc..251 Burbank im-
posed an 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. curfew on the operation of
Hollywood-Burbank Airport. Lockheed sought to enjoin
the city's ordinance, claiming that this curfew was pre-
empted by federal regulation and administrative action.
The Supreme Court, examining the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958252 and the Noise Control Act of 1972,253 found that
Congress intended the federal government to have "full
control over aircraft noise, pre-empting state and local con-
trol."254 Moreover, Congressional intent left "no room for
local curfews or other local controls. 12 55 Finally, the Court
noted that the objectives of both acts required "a uniform
and exclusive system of federal regulation."25 6 The Court
ultimately held that the curfew was preempted. 57
To apply the noise pollution analysis by analogy to the
South Coast Basin air pollution problem, one must first sub-
stitute "the FAA" for "federal government" and substitute
"the EPA" for "state and local control."25 8 Then, one can
ask the three questions outlined in City of Burbank.259
The first question is whether Congress intended the FAA
to have full control over aircraft emissions, thereby pre-
empting EPA control. The CAA establishes a comprehen-
250 See generally City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973); San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 955 U.S. 1000 (1982); United States v. California, 639 F. Supp. 199 (E.D.
Cal. 1986); National Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 603 P.2d 1329 (Cal.
1979); San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 557 (Cal. App., 1977); Harrison v. Schwartz, 572 A.2d 528 (Md. 1990).
251 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
252 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1358 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
252 Noise Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1234, 14 C.F.R. pts. 71, 73, 75, 77, 91, 93,
95, 97 (1972).
-54 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 633.
255 Id. at 638.
2- Id. at 639.
257 Id. at 638-39.
2- Note that if we accept the notion that the EPA is standing in the shoes of either
the State of California or the District, then "the EPA" substitutes easily for "state or
local control."
259 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 630-40.
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sive plan for aircraft emission regulation. 6 ° Clean Air Act
section 231 requires the EPA to issue emission limitations,
but CAA section 231 (c) expressly vests the FAA with veto
power.261 And, pursuant to CAA section 232(a), only the
FAA can ensure compliance with the emission standards
through the certification process. 62 Although one might
try to argue that the FAA has full control through veto and
certification power, the EPA must issue the standards in the
first place. 63 Thus, in answer to question one, Congress
apparently did not intend the FAA to have full control over
air emissions.
The second question from City of Burbank is whether Con-
gressional intent left any room for EPA control. In City of
Burbank the Court found it persuasive that Congress
amended section 611 of the Federal Aviation Act to involve
the EPA in the comprehensive scheme of federal control of
the aircraft noise problem. 64 Similarly, the comprehensive
scheme for federal control of aircraft emissions leaves room
for both EPA and FAA control, as expressed by CAA section
231, which provides for FAA review (and possible veto) of
standards issued by the EPA. 265 Therefore, in answer to the
second question, Congressional intent apparently did leave
room for EPA control of aircraft emissions.
The third question from City of Burbank is whether the
objectives of the act require a uniform system of controls.
The Court examined the language of the Federal Aviation
Act, namely sections 1348(a), 1348(c), and 1431 (d) (3), de-
termining that the "interdependence of these factors re-
quires a uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation
if the congressional objectives underlying the Federal Avia-
tion Act are to be fulfilled."266 Certainly, section 1348(a)
(which requires a delicate balance between efficiency and
260 42 U.S.C. §§ 7571-7574 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
261 42 U.S.C. § 7571(c).
22 42 U.S.C. § 7571.
263 42 U.S.C. § 7571 (a) (2).
2- City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 629-30.
265 42 U.S.C. § 7571 (1988 & Supp. V 1992).
266 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 639.
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safety) and section 1348(c) (which requires protection of
persons on the ground) are equally applicable to the pres-
ent situation.26 7 But, section 1431(d)(3), which provides
that regulations to control noise pollution must be consis-
tent with the highest degree of safety, is not.268
The Court noted that "fractionalized control of the tim-
ing of takeoffs and landings would severely limit the flexibil-
ity of FAA in controlling air traffic flow." 269 It follows that
such fractionalized control necessitated by the proposed
LAX regulations, which also involve takeoff and landing
procedures, would likewise limit the flexibility of the FAA in
controlling air traffic flow. One could thus argue in answer
to question three that the objectives of the Federal Aviation
Act do require a uniform set of controls, thereby preempt-
ing the EPA from issuing the proposed District regulations.
Although the City of Burbank analysis provides by analogy
some insight into the problem of "federal v. federal" pre-
emption, the City of Burbank Court did not seek to distin-
guish one federal agency from another, rather it simply
held that the federal government had preempted the
field.270 Therefore, the noise pollution analysis does not
provide a complete framework for resolving the "federal v.
federal" preemption issue.
C. TRADITIONAL PREEMPTION
("EPA AS STATE V. FEDERAL")
Another approach, again relying on the notion that the
EPA stands in the state's shoes, is to apply a traditional pre-
emption analysis to the South Coast Basin scenario. The
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution gives
Congress the power to preempt state law.27' Preemption
can occur in any one of at least four situations. 2  As stated
267 49 U.S.C.A. § 40103 (West Supp. 1994).
M0 49 U.S.C.A. § 44715(b) (West Supp. 1994).
20 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 639.
270 Id. at 640.
271 U.S. CONST. art. V.
272 Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 994 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1993).
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by the Supreme Court, Congressional intent "may be ex-
plicitly stated [ (1) express preemption] in the statute's lan-
guage or implicitly contained [(2) implied preemption] in
its structure and purpose."273 And, "in the absence of an
express Congressional command, state law is pre-empted if
that law actually conflicts with federal law" [ (3) conflict pre-
emption] .274 Finally, preemption also occurs if federal law
so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reason-
able the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it" [ (4) field preemption].275 In preemption
analysis, "the purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone " 2 7 6
Neither express nor implied preemption is at issue in the
South Coast Basin situation. But, assuming the EPA stands
in the state's or District's shoes, conflict preemption and
field preemption issues arise. Conflict preemption occurs
when state or local law and federal laws actually conflict.27 7
Conflict preemption possibly arises in the South Coast Ba-
sin scenario because state law, as expressed by the FIP, may
conflict with federal law, as expressed by the CAA. In par-
ticular, as discussed above, the CAA may not contemplate
the EPA issuing work practice or operational standards to
control aircraft emissions, but the proposed FIP requires
just such action.278 If conflict preemption exists, then any
action by the EPA (acting as a substitute for California via
the FIP) to regulate aircraft emissions would be preempted
by federal law (CAA).279
If federal law so thoroughly occupies the field as to rea-
sonably imply that Congress left no room for state or local
law to supplement the field, then field preemption oc-
"' Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992) (quotingJames
v. Roth Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).




278 See supra notes 171-206 and accompanying text.
279 Cipolone, 112 S. Ct. at 2617.
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curs." ° Field preemption might also apply to the South
Coast Basin scenario, depending on the scope of the field.
According to City of Burbank, federal law certainly occupies
the field of aircraft regulation.28 ' And Congress has likely
preempted the field of aircraft emissions.2  Thus, Congress
has left no room for state or local control of regulation of
2813aircraft emissions. Consequently, any action by the EPA
(acting as a substitute for California via the FIP) to regulate
aircraft emissions would be preempted by federal law. The
circular absurdity of this observation highlights the diffi-
culty of applying a traditional preemption analysis to the
South Coast Basin scenario, even assuming the EPA oper-
ates as a substitute for the state.
This comment has examined multiple approaches to the
preemption problem in the South Coast Basin. Unfortu-
nately, no approach provides a satisfactory analysis of the
problem. A National Wildlife approach stops short, because
the EPA and the FAA do not "address different aspects" of
aircraft emission regulation.2 8 4 A Kleppe approach, while
suggesting that the FAA occupies the primary role in the
scheme of aircraft emission regulations, does not resolve
the issue because the EPA's role in issuing the emission
standard is likely not "inconsistent with that scheme. '285 A
City of Burbank analysis, which suggests the EPA is pre-
empted by the FAA, only applies (1) on the assumption that
the EPA stands in the shoes of the state and (2) by analogy
2 Id.
2 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 638.
282 San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 67 Cal.
App. 3d 361, 370 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977).
-s 42 U.S.C. § 7571 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). In fact, the DOT commented that
under the Federal Preemption section of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 41713, Congress precluded state regulation of "prices, routes and service" in air
transportation to avoid actions by states that would impair the ability of the DOT to
establish a national and international air transportation system consistent with the
policies set forth in the Federal Aviation Act. DOT Comment, supra note 96, at 7.
Thus, the DOT argued, "it is not realistic to assume that Congress would ... have
granted EPA the unilateral regulatory authority explicitly denied to States." DOT
Comment, supra note 96, at 7.
- See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
- See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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from noise pollution to air pollution.286 Finally, a tradi-
tional preemption analysis, which depends on the assump-
tion that the EPA operates as a substitute for the state or
District, leads to circular results. 87
VI. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, this comment cannot answer the truly im-
portant question for the South Coast Basin - how to re-
solve the tension between environmental and economic
health. Legal analysis simply cannot determine whether
the EPA should be able to promulgate such stringent opera-
tional regulations so that compliance might bring the eco-
nomic engine embodied in LAX and surrounding airports
to a halt. As the EPA noted in its FIP proposed on May 5,
1994, some eleven years after the first South Coast Basin
citizen's suit, that question must be answered by the citizens
and future citizens who live in those communities.288
This comment has, however, attempted to examine some
of the legal issues that may arise should the EPA finalize its
proposed FIP for the South Coast Basin. Nonetheless, it re-
mains unclear whether the EPA has the authority to pro-
mulgate aircraft emission standards the state itself would be
precluded from issuing. Furthermore, because the EPA is
probably not preempted by the FAA, the EPA may have the
authority to promulgate operational standards. If the EPA
does have the legal authority to promulgate such opera-
tional standards, the practical effect of such standards may
be to force certain commercial airlines to modify their op-
erations in order to comply with emissions limits. Those
airlines that, for safety or other reasons, choose not to
change their operations may be forced to cease operations
in the South Coast Basin altogether.
- See supra notes 249-269 and accompanying text.
287 See supra notes 270-282 and accompanying text.
288 59 Fed. Reg. 23,264, 23,269 (1994).
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